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Exploring the context of service
provision in Senegal: Social dynamics
and decentralisation in the Senegalese
countryside1
Mayke Kaag
1 In this paper, I will not be directly concerned with the everyday practices of public and
collective services and those who make use of them. Instead, I aim to take a broader view
on the social, political and cultural context in which services take shape and the role of
decentralisation therein. In this regard, I will focus on some dynamics that are important
for  the  functioning  of  public  and  collective  services  in  Senegal  today:  dynamics  of
interaction between different elites striving for power, dynamics of shifting norms and
values, and dynamics of changing relationships between the local level and the supra-
local level of government. I will explore their character starting from concrete examples
of  interaction and investigate  how they are  part  of  longer  term social  processes.  As
governance and service provision in Senegal take place in a context of decentralisation
policy, this empirical processual perspective will allow the role of decentralisation to be
evaluated  in  concrete  terms,  as  opposed  to  generalised  and  normative  ideas  on
decentralisation that  are  used by  many donors.  Furthermore,  as  we will  see,  such a
perspective may complement observations made from a more practice-oriented angle.
2 In Senegal, as in many other African countries nowadays, public and collective services
take  shape  in  a  context  of  decentralisation  policy.  In  the  new  paradigm  of  "good
governance", decentralisation is an important component, since it,  it  is assumed, will
contribute to democratisation as well  as to a more efficient mode of service delivery
(World Bank 1989a, 1992, Hyden & Bratton 1992). At the end of the 1980s, in development
circles therewas a strong sentiment of feasibility in this respect: with the descent to the
local level, the developmental problems encountered seemed easier to estimate and to
deal with. The ideal was that local communities would take control of their own affairs.
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As the central state retreated from the countryside as a result of structural adjustment
programmes, international NGOs prepared to work with decentralised government and
other local organisations. In response, many local NGOs were founded.
3 Discussions on decentralisation are often rather technical,  focusing on issues such as
which  responsibilities  should  be  delegated  and  how new structures  of  decentralised
government should be organised (e.g. World Bank 1989b, Topan 1994). Even now that
decentralisation policies have been introduced in many African countries and evaluation
studies start being published, feeble performance of decentralisation is often explained
by factors such as legislative and organisational weaknesses and lack of financial means.
The  measures  proposed  centre  around  the  strengthening  of  the  capacities  and  the
legitimacy  of  institutions,  for  example  by  means  of  better  education  of  local
administrators, clearer definitions of competencies of different actors, and enlargement
of financial funds (e.g. Vengroff & Johnston 1987, Villadsen & Lubanga 1997, Gellar 1997).
Critics,  however,  have  argued  that  that  these  technocratic  approaches  conceal  the
political fact that decentralisation has often been introduced (in such a way as) to serve
the needsand preoccupations of the international donor community and national African
governments, rather than being set up on the basis of the needs and perspectives of the
local  populations  and  working  from  political  realities  on  the  ground.(e.g.  Jacob  &
Blundo1997; see also Kaag & Venema 2002)
4 We could  do  away  with  concepts  like  decentralisation,  disqualifying  them as  hollow
statements, mere subjects on the political agenda of donors and, in their wake, of African
states. It is however important to realise that the implementation of this political agenda
provokes and animates real  processes in society,  of  which the content  and direction
should be studied. It then becomes clear how decentralisation policy is linked to, and
feeds into actual dynamics at play.
5 In the following sections,  I  will  focus on some of  these actual  dynamics that  can be
distinguished at the country-side of Senegal: dynamics of interaction between different
elites  striving  for  power,  dynamics  of  shifting  norms  and  values,  and  dynamics  of
changing relationships between the local level and the supra-local level of government2. I
shall thereby give ample room to concrete examples3, hoping that some richness of detail
may contribute to our discussions. Yet while my aim is to provoke reflection, comparison
and debate, rather than to offer completed analyses of the dynamics and cases described,
I will treat them rather loosely. In the conclusion, I will return to the consequences of my
observations for decentralisation and the study of service provision in rural Senegal4.
6 Throughout the last few decades a new elite of educated youngsters has emerged in many
places across Africa, who threaten the hegemony of the old elite of high-born and affluent
families (see for example Blundo 1995, Geschiere 1996, Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan
1998). To illustrate how these dynamics of interaction between different elites striving for
power may present themselves in the countryside of central Senegal, I shall start with the
following case.
7 In 1989, the village of Kaymor was given a water tower, which was financed by the Italian
government. A management committee was installed, but after continued problems, this
committee was removed in 1993 due to mismanagement. A new committee was installed,
which functioned until the pump of the water tower broke down in May 1994. By 1995,
the water tower had been repaired and it had been furnished with solar plates, this time
financed by the German government; Kaymor had been selected by the Hydraulic Service
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of Kaolack to profit from this project. In order to obtain the solar energy system, the
population had to collect a sum of CFA 450.000 to be earmarked for management costs.
8 When I arrived in Kaymor at the end of 1995, I wanted to interview the management
committee of the water tower, and was therefore brought into contact with Mahmadou,
one  of  the  teachers  of  the  primary  school.  I  was  told  he  was  the  president  of  the
committee. During the interview, I learned that the committee was currently inactive; the
people were waiting for the reparation of the water tower to be finished and the solar
plates to be installed. It was only a year later, at the putting into use of the water tower
under the new system, that I learned that there was a problem with the committee.
"December 9th, 1995, there is a gathering under the trees at the marketplace. A team
from the Hydraulic Service of Kaolack has come to instruct the local population on the
new mode of management of the water tower. There are only men amongst the audience;
the young woman who is a member of the team of the Hydraulic Service says that it is a
pity that the women are absent. The village head explains that this is the time of the year
that the women work in the fields.
The agent of the Hydraulic Service tells that the project will guarantee the installation
and the maintenance of the equipment for a period of five years. In addition, a monthly
fee is asked from the population, which will be used for development purposes. For the
management of the water tower, five commissions will be formed: one commission for
health issues, one commission for development issues that with the fees collected will
initiate little development projects such as the purchase ofa millet mill, one financial
commission, charged with managing the money for the maintenance and the reparation
of the water tower, and one commission for maintenance issues that is charged with the
supervision of cleanliness, reparation of eventual defects, etc. He concludes by saying
that within a few days, the water tower will be connected to the taps of the village.
The chief of the CERP asks if there are still any questions. Babacar takes the floor,
thanking for the assistance the village has received from the project. Following this, he
says that he has heard a broadcast from Radio Kaolack in which the composition of the
management committee had been mentioned; the name of the president, however, had
not been mentioned; had there really been a change on the board?
Another man rises and asks in an emotional voice where the money collected by the
population has gone. Many people in the audience side with him, noisily expressing their
approval.
Mahmadou defends himself, saying that all information is available, all notes and all
correspondence. At that moment, El Hadji Touré takes the floor. He speaks calmly, an
amused smile on his lips. It then appears that in fact, he had been the president, and that
Mahmadou had only been the vice-president. When the committee had come to his house
to ask him to take care of the money collected by the population, he allegedly refused to
do so because he feared that things would be unclear afterwards; if, for example, he died,
nobody would know that the money did not belong to him personally. As a consequence,
Mahmadou and his fellows created a new committee, with Mahmadou as the president.
Now, at the meeting, El Hadji Touré says he had not been informed about that; thus, could
this change be considered legitimate?"
The agent of the Hydraulic Service intervenes, saying that “family problems have to be
solved within the family”, but the heat is on, and the discussions continue without
anyone listening to the agent. The senior men gather around the village chief while the
others attack each other with Mahmadou caught in the middle.
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Finally, after some hot debate, the calm returns. It appears that the committee has
returned to its original composition: El Hadji Touré as the president, Mahmadou as the
vice-president".
9 To understand this case, one has to know that although Mahmadou originates from the
village, he is of low birth. He adheres to faction A of the Parti Socialiste (PS)5, and he is
the administrative secretary of the party board at the level of the sub-district. El Hadji
Touré is one of the notables of Kaymor, and he is closely related to the most important
family of the sub-district, the Touré family in the sub-district’s capital. In addition, he is
one of the richest men in the village, exploiting some taxi-brousses. He adheres also to
faction A, but he is not directly involved in politics; it is his first wife who is the president
of the women’s group of the village and who also presides over all the women’s groups in
the rural community. El Hadji Touré’s mother was the first woman councillor in the rural
council of Kaymor.
10 Knowing this, we can see that the two men in fact represent two kinds of elites. On the
one hand, there is the 'traditional' elite, consisting of notables like El Hadji Touré who
owe their prestige to their high birth and wealth. At the other side, there is a 'modern'
kind of elite, intellectuals like Mahmadou who owe their importance to their education
and to the fact that they are lettered. Often, this goes together with a good position as a
teacher or a civil servant, and a rather high position in the party (cf. Blundo 1998).
11 In this example, it is the ancient elite that still wins the battle for power, also because of
the 'natural' superiority that radiates from El Hadji Touré. Mahmadou and his supporters
try to attack this power, but they do not (yet) succeed. What can be deduced from this
example is that the coming elite, which is judged to a larger extent upon its behaviour, is
more vulnerable than the established elite. The latter is to a large degree bolstered by its
established status, and in this manner has more room for manoeuvre.
12 It is clear that decentralisation has contributed to the dynamics of contest between elites
by  opening  up new arenas  to  fight  over  means.  In  particular  the  upcoming elite  of
intellectuals often profit from the opportunities created by decentralised government
and the interventions of NGOs due to their ability to act in a bureaucratic and formal
environment.  This example,  however,  shows that their efforts to act as 'development
brokers' are not always successful,  thus providing some counter-balance to studies of
'development brokers' that often tend to focus on success-stories only.
13 Yet, I want to emphasise that it would be wrong to perceive these dynamics of interaction
simply as a battle between two social categories that are diametrically opposed. In fact,
the person who unites the characteristics of both elites, that is, the one who is educated
and of high birth at the same time, is the one that has the best chance of attaining a
position of power. In the rural community of Kaymor, for example,  at the 1996 local
elections, the notable who had presided the rural council for 22 years was ousted: the new
president of the rural council was a young man who had gone to school, and who was the
son of the Kaymor village chief.
14 From a processual perspective, this suggests that the one elite does not simply take over
from the other,  that there is  no clear succession,  but that mechanisms of  continuity
instead play a role. We might compare this to another example of interaction between an
established elite and an upcoming elite in Senegalese history, because, of course, this
dynamic is not a new phenomenon. In the beginning of the 20th century, a new elite
developed,  consisting  of  people  who  were  able  to  profit  from  the  booming  peanut
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business in Senegal, among them people of slave descent and foreigners. Continuity was
reached by these people being absorbed by the established elite of high born locals. What
actually occurs is more difficult to pinpoint, but it boils down to the fact that qualities
that are the strength and weapon of the new elite are also incorporated as a weapon by
the established elite. This suggests that instead of radical change, a process of gradual
adaptation and transformation of the established elite is perhaps more likely.  In this
situation, the old elite remains in power while its characteristics slowly change.
15 Governance  today  in  the  countryside  of  Senegal  is  not  only  influenced by  dynamics
triggered by the interplay of established and upcoming elites, but also by dynamics due to
changing norms and notions of what is good and desirable and what is not. Of course
neither  these  dynamics  are  something  new:  to  the  values  of  honour  and generosity
traditionally highly valued among the Wolof, for example, religious values such as piety
and modesty were added when Islam spread over the country from the 16th century
onwards. And, just as in the case of elites, the one idea is not simply exchanged for an
other. Often, new norms and values are added to existing ones, exist side by side (rightly
or not in a harmonious way), are contextually valid, or merge into something new. The
following  example  clearly  illustrates  how  different  norms  concerning  governance
actually come to the fore in the Senegalese countryside.
16 During the preamble to the local elections of 1996, a political meeting of faction A of the
Parti Socialiste was held in Kaymor, the chief village of the rural community.
"Sambu, the leader of faction A at the level of the sub-district arrives by car, accompanied
by a team of fellow politicians. He sets himself at the table in front of the audience,
Moussa, the local leader of faction A taking a seat at his side. The meeting begins, and
some speakers take the floor.
At a given moment, it is Old Babou’s turn to speak. As with the other speakers, the band
starts to beat the tam-tam, and they sing to his glory. The old man evidently enjoys it,
above on the podium, and to thank the band, he takes a 5000 CFA note out of his pocket to
give to them. The singers start to sing still louder, the tam-tam is beaten with still more
force, and the women in the room show their appreciation by dancing with ever more
energy. Babou, as a real juggler, starts to conjure more 1000 and 5000 CFA notes out of his
pocket, and the enthusiasm of the audience seems unlimited. Temperature rises, and the
room becomes too small for the moving people. During this spectacle, Sambu seats there,
still and with a neutral expression on his face. Also Moussa, his young local homologue,
does not bat an eye-lid."
17 Babou’s behaviour seems to belong to a political world very different from that of Sambu
and Moussa. Babou is an old borom barke who has built his prestige on his wealth in
combination  with  a  large  degree  of  generosity.  And  that  last  quality  is  greatly
appreciated. As a young man remarked one day later referring to this incident: "Having
the capacity to give is a gift from God". Sambu and Moussa evidently belong to a new
generation  of  politicians  that  is  more  technocratic  and  more  business-like,  and  -
apparently - not in favour of personal myth-making.
18 At firstglance the issue seems rather clear:  the old generation apparently adheres to
'traditional' norms and 'traditional' ideas about who is legitimated to speak and act; the
new generation has adopted more technocratic ideas on governance from outside. The
people in the audience, however, all seem to highly appreciate the old man behaving in a
'traditional'  fashion.  And  what  about  the  young  man  expressing  his  admiration  for
Babou’s generosity the day after? In fact, it is not simply that one social category adheres
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to one set of norms, while the other social category adheres to the other set. Moreover,
the adherence to norms may be highly contextual. That is,  someone might apply one
norm in one context, but adhere to another in a different context. One may, for example,
value a politician at the national level being business-like and formally strict, and at the
same time expect  that  the  local  politician one has  voted for,  distributes  his  favours
selectively to his clients. This suggests that different norms apply to those far away and
those nearby, for those foreign and those familiar.  The 'claims of familiarity',  among
other reasons, make it difficult for local politicians to not become corrupt. The young
president  of  the  rural  council  cited  in  the  section  above,  for  example,  could  be
characterised  as  rather  'technocratic'  and 'development-oriented'  and he  was  highly
motivated to put an end to all favouritism and corruptive practices in the rural council.
During his mandate, however, he was confronted with the expectations of his supporters,
who wanted him to distribute his favours as former patrons had done, and it was difficult
for him to resist these claims, also because he himself wanted to be a good leader for his
followers6.
19 The preceding sections have already shown interaction between, and intermingling of
contexts  and  levels  of  governance.  In  the  first  example,  the  hydraulic  service  is
confronted with local  power dynamics when it,  as  a  consequence of  decentralisation
policy, starts to co-operate with the local population in a participatory setting. In the
second example, we have seen how norms and ideas about how a politician should behave
trickledown from the 'outside' into the rural community. Here, decentralisation has an
influence  because  the  vertical  pyramid  of  political  relationships  is  strengthened  by
decentralisation (cf.  Blundo 1997),  while  external  co-operation with the local  level  is
stimulated. The relationship between the local and higher levels of administration and
political  organisation is  not  one-dimensional,  however,  consisting only  of  upward or
downward influences. In fact, it comprises a complex dynamic of mutual influence, as the
following  example  reveals.  This  process  of  mutual  influence  is  intensified  by
decentralisation policy, but also by other developments, such as the introduction of new
means of communication.
20 In 1996, a big American NGO started a project for the communal management of natural
resources in the rural community. The funds for this project had to be administered by a
local management committee, composed of representatives of different categories of the
population, such as women, youngsters, cattle-holders, agriculturists, parents of children
in primary school. The committee was officially under supervision of the rural council
that also had three representatives in the committee. In reality, however, from the outset
there was strong competition between the president of the management committee of
the project and the president of the rural council, who belonged to opposite factions: the
former adhered to faction A of the PS, the latter to faction B of the same party. In this
way, while the management committee had been intended to serve as an asset for the
rural council,  in reality it turned out to be a rival body. The American NGO that had
chosen to work with the decentralised government and by way of a local management
committee in this way got involved in local power struggles; this 'localisation' surely had
an impact on the implementation of the project (see also Kaag 1999, 2001). So far for the
project in general. In the context of this paper, I want to focus on the re-election of the
management committee that took place in 1998.
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21 For the re-election of the management committee, all categories of the population were
summoned to choose their candidates so that they could be presented during a meeting
with the project staff.
22 "A team composed of the sub-prefect, some agents of the rural extension service, and
three members of the project staff have come from the capital of the sub-district. They
are received in the community home and take their places behind the table together with
the president of the management committee and the president of the rural council. The
women’s  groups  are  first  to  vote  their  representatives;  the  others  presents  are  sent
outside.  The  vote  passes  without  major  problems.  It  is  only  when  it  is  the  rural
councillors’ turn to present their candidates that the quarrels start.
23 After a discussion between the councillors in the room, the president of the rural council
refuses to take part in the vote and leaves the building. A member of the project staff goes
after him to talk to him in the court; there all the others who had been sent outside
follow the incident with great curiosity. However, the efforts of the project official are
apparently fruitless and finally, all councillors of faction B leave the community home,
leaving the team with faction A behind in the room… There,  it  is  finally  decided to
proceed with the election of the representative of the water tower committees. At the
house of the president of the rural council, the president addresses the mass of followers
crowded in his court yard."
24 The commotion during this meeting is difficult to understand without some knowledge of
what  happened  some  days  earlier.  That  is,  the  sub-prefect  had  sent  a  letter  to  the
president of the rural council to tell him to convene a meeting of the rural council before
the day of the meeting with the project staff in order to be able to present the candidates
of the rural council.
25 The meeting of the rural council was held on Sunday; the meeting with the project staff
was scheduled for Tuesday. During the meeting of the rural council, twenty-three of a
total of thirty-one councillors were present (one woman-councillor had died but had not
yet been replaced): the quorum had been reached, but it must be said that the majority of
the councillors present adhered to faction B and to the PDS7. By secret vote, two young
councillors,  one  of  the  PDS and one  of  faction B  of  the  PS  were  elected.  Until  that
moment, there was no reason whatsoever for dissatisfaction. However, what made the
councillors of faction B so furious was the fact that after this meeting, the sub-prefect had
convened yet another meeting of the rural council, the reason being that for an official
meeting of the rural council the presence of the sub-prefect or one of the agents of the
rural extension service is required to take the minutes. The sub-prefect, however, had
convened the meeting by means of the president of the management committee, which
was evidently not according to the rules, and which evoked the suspicion that the latter
had been involved in the initiative. What is more, the successor of the deceased woman
councillor  had  also  been  summoned  to  attend,  while  he  had  not  yet  been  officially
installed.  It  was due to this  course of  events  that  the president  of  the rural  council
refused his participation during the meeting described above.
26 How could this  deadlock be overcome? It  was decided that  there would be a second
meeting with the rural council, the sub-prefect and the project staff on Thursday. The
councillors of faction B and the PDS however declared that they would not be attending
this meeting. On Wednesday, the president of the rural council  went to the district’s
capital to talk to the prefect. The latter gave the advice to always ensure in the future
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that a representative of the administration would be present to take the minutes. The
president of the rural council would have answered that he agreed to that, but this time
the sub-prefect had been clear in simply saying that the rural council had to be convened
before the meeting with the project staff. After the president of the rural council had
returned at night, the sub-prefect called him. He had talked extensively with both the
president of the rural council and the councillor of the PDS who was a candidate for the
management  committee.  After  that,  the  councillors  had  decided  to  participate  in
Thursday’s meeting.
27 At that meeting, faction A had proposed to choose one representative of faction A and
one  representative  of  faction  B  to  participate  in  the  management  committee  of  the
project. The president of the rural council, however, declared again that in fact the rural
council had made their choice on Sunday, and if the project staff did not want to accept
this choice then they had to make their own plans, but in that case, he, the president of
the rural council,  would no longer join them. Then, the representative of the project
manager declared that the project could not work in a rural community when it lacked
the support of the president of the rural council. Moreover, it was the president of the
management committee who became angry, since he thought that the project staff took
the president of the rural council too much into account while it was he who was the
president of the management committee of the project.
28 It is clear that also during this meeting no solution was reached. It was only on Tuesday,
the week thereafter, that the affair could finally be settled. During a third meeting, the
councillor of the PDS who was elected as a representative in the management committee
agreed to resign for a councillor of section A of the PS. It seems that during a very call,
the sub-prefect had pressed him to give up because otherwise, he had said, the project
would leave the rural community. In this way, a councillor of faction A and a councillor of
faction B finally entered the management committee of the project as representatives of
the rural council.
29 Considering this case,  we can conclude that in fact,  all  actors involved have tried to
manipulate the affair, and for this, they have played the margins of the official rules,
sometimes staying within their limits, sometimes crossing the border. The president of
the rural council, for example, convenes a meeting, but it suits him well that it is mainly
the councillors of his own faction B who turn up. When two councillors of faction B and
the PDS are chosen, he tries to defend this outcome, while the sub-prefect in his turn tries
to turn things around others in noticing a person that has not yet been installed, may be
at the instigation of the president of the management committee. Moreover since nobody
can wash his hands for blame, no one can immediately attack an other for the way they
have conducted themselves.
30 What may also be concluded is that there is a clash of different competencies: the office of
sub-prefect, president of the rural council and president of the management committee
are supposed to supplement and support each other, but in reality a strong rivalry exists
between them. In addition, there is a clash between personalities who all want to play a
role of importance and whose sense of honour is easily violated. 
31 It is interesting that after the process of localisation that had characterised the start of
the project in the rural community, the conflict presented here shows an enlargement of
scale. The project had been implicated in the local dynamic, but from there it ties the
rural community strongly to supra-local interests and centres of decision-making, such as
Exploring the context of service provision in Senegal: Social dynamics and de...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 26 | 2008
8
those of the district and the headquarters of the project in Dakar. These come to directly
feel the effects of local dynamics.
32 The telephone plays a particular role in this. In fact, the rural community had only been
connected to the national telephone network since early 1998. From the case described
above, it can be deduced that this has already changed local politics. The influence of
higher levels of administration such as that of the sub-district and the district on the
local situation can be executed more directly than before8; on the other hand, by these
new means of communication, local opinions can equally more easily be made known at
higher levels of administration.
33 In the above, I have tried to pinpoint some dynamics that in my view are important for
understanding the factual functioning of collective and public services in the countryside
in Senegal today, pointing to the way governance takes form in reality, as opposed to the
ideas on (good) governance and decentralisation held by many donors.  Starting from
concrete examples of interaction between people I have tried to put these examples in
perspective by applying a processual approach. From this perspective, it becomes clear
that  decentralisation  is  only  another  element  that  adds  to  historical  dynamics  in
operation.  Yet,  it  certainly has  an influence,  however not  exactly  as  foreseen in the
official discourse that is conducted among donors.
34 Thus, in considering the dynamics of interplay between different elites, I have examined
the interaction between an established elite of affluent and mostly high-born men and an
upcoming elite of educated locals who try to establish their power by attaining important
positions in development projects and committees. I concluded that there is a struggle for
power. Decentralisation has stimulated this struggle in opening up new arenas for contest
over power and resources. From a broader historical perspective however we can identify
not only struggle but also mechanisms for elitist continuity. This suggests that instead of
radical change, a process of gradual adaptation and transformation of the established
elite  is  perhaps  more  likely  in  the  Senegalese  countryside.  More  generally,  we  may
conclude that decentralisation is not the direct road to democracy but that it feeds into
ongoing processes of inclusion and exclusion.
35 Furthermore, in considering the dynamics of shifting norms and ideas, I have argued that
decentralisation has facilitated the trickle-down of external ideas concerning governance
to the local level. By an example, I showed how the existence of different norms and
values with respect to how a politician should behave came to the fore in a Senegalese
rural community. In applying a processual perspective, I highlighted that the one idea is
not simply exchanged for another idea, but that, in fact, different norms continue to co-
exist and are contextually applied. The observation that the contextual application of
norms is often related to the question of who is considered familiar and who is not,
suggests that processes of inclusion and exclusion also play an important role in the
dynamical  interplay  of  norms and ideas  concerning governance.  In  general,  we may
conclude that decentralisation does not automatically lead to more transparency and
more efficiency as its advocates assume, but that it may contribute to a proliferation of
norms and ideas, on the one hand facilitating flexibility on the part of the social actors,
but  on  the  other  hand  also  leading  to  more  administrative  complexity  and  less
transparency.
36 Finally, in considering the dynamics of interplay between different levels of governance,
we may conclude that decentralisation does not readily lead to more control of local
communities over their own affairs. In fact, different influences, such as decentralisation
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measures  and  the  introduction  of  new means  of  communication,  lead  to  a  complex
intermingling of levels and bodies of governance, having consequences for the issues of
inclusion/exclusion and familiarity/unfamiliarity mentioned above,  which I  think are
worth further study.
37 By pointing to some actual dynamics influencing governance, relating them to longer
term processes of which they are a part, and placing decentralisation in this historical
dynamic, I have tried to outline part of the context in which public and collective services
are performed today in the countryside of Senegal. In so doing, I have wanted to indicate
that  actual  service  provision  should  not  be  studied  merely  from  the  angle  of
decentralisation, as decentralisation is only one element in a complex historical dynamic.
My plea is to study the functioning of public and collective services in Africa today by
focusing on practices of  service provision as part  of  actual  social  dynamics in which
policy  measures  such  as  decentralisation  play  a  role,  and  by  placing  these  actual
dynamics in a longer term perspective of historical change and continuity.
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NOTES
1.  Paper prepared for the APAD-conference "The Governance of Daily Life in Africa:
Public and Collective Services and their users", Leiden, 22-25 May 2002.
2.  For analytical purposes I will treat them in separate sections. In fact, however, these
dynamics are of course interrelated, as also will appear throughout the argument.
3.  These stem from fieldwork conducted in the rural community of Kaymor in the
southern central part of Senegal as part of my PhD-research (see also Kaag 2001).
4.  Here, I will not deal with the decentralisation policy pursued by the Senegalese
government extensively. What is important to know is that decentralisation has a relative
long history in Senegal: from the 1970s onwards rural communities were created
consisting of some ten to twenty villages and administered by a rural council of elected
locals. The mandate of these rural councils has been gradually extended, finally in 1996
when a number of competencies that had previously been the domain of the central state,
such as healthcare and the management of natural resources, were delegated to the
communities. For further information, see for example SAFEFOD 1996, Blundo 1997, Kaag
2001.
5.  Although Senegal is a multiparty democracy since the 1970s, the Parti Socialiste, the
party of Senegal’s first president Senghor, retained its hegemony until very recently.
There has however always existed a strong rivalry between different factions within the
party.
6.  See also Chabal & Daloz (1999) who make comparable observations concerning the
room for manoeuvre for African leaders at the national level.
7.  At the local elections of 1996, faction B of the PS had made a deal for co-operation with
the PDS in order to beat faction A, which had always been the main faction in the rural
community.
8.  In this context, I would like to refer to Bayart who states that the introduction of
information technology in Sub Saharan Africa has permitted not only a change of scale of
the political space but also an intensification of social control, offering the rulers the
means to control, constrain and persuade their subjects (1996: 17). 
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